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a b s t r a c t
We study the fundamental problem 2NASH of computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) point in
bimatrix games. We start by proposing a novel characterization of the NE set, via a bijective
map to the solution set of a parameterized quadratic program (NEQP), whose feasible space
is the highly structured set of correlated equilibria (CE). This is, to our knowledge, the first
characterization of the subset of CE points that are in ‘‘1–1’’ correspondence with the NE
set of the game, and contributes to the quite lively discussion on the relation between the
spaces of CE and NE points in a bimatrix game (e.g., [15,26,33]).
We proceed with studying a property of bimatrix games, which we call mutually
concavity (MC), that assures polynomial-time tractability of 2NASH, due to the convexity of
a proper parameterized quadratic program (either NEQP, or a parameterized variant of the
Mangasarian & Stone formulation [23]) for a particular value of the parameter. We prove
various characterizations of the MC-games, which eventually lead us to the conclusion
that this class is equivalent to the class of strategically zero-sum (SZS) games of Moulin
& Vial [25]. This gives an alternative explanation of the polynomial-time tractability of
2NASH for these games, not depending on the solvability of zero-sum games. Moreover, the
recognition of the MC-property for an arbitrary game is much faster than the recognition
SZS-property. This, along with the comparable time-complexity of linear programs and
convex quadratic programs, leads us to a much faster algorithm for 2NASH in MC-games.
We conclude our discussion with a comparison of MC-games (or, SZS-games) to k-rank
games,which are known to admit for2NASH a FPTASwhen k is fixed [18], and a polynomial-
time algorithm for k = 1 [2]. We finally explore some closeness properties under well-
known NE set preserving transformations of bimatrix games.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the ‘‘holy grail quests’’ of theoretical computer science in the last decade, has been to characterize the
computational complexity ofkNASH, the problemof constructing an arbitraryNash equilibrium (NE) point in a k-player finite
normal-form game. There has been a massive attack on various refinements of the problem (e.g., a NE point maximizing the
payoff to some player, its support size, etc.) that all have lead to hardness (NP-completeness) results [17,10]. Eventually
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kNASHwas proved to be PPAD-complete for k ≥ 3 [11,14], but also for the bimatrix case [7]. Moreover, even computing an
n−Ω(1)

-approximate NE point for the bimatrix case is PPAD-complete [8], thus excluding the existence of a fully polynomial
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for 2NASH, unless PPAD = P. It has also been proved that the celebrated combinatorial
algorithm of Lemke & Howson [21] may take an exponential number of steps to terminate [29].
Given the apparent hardness of 2NASH, two main research trends emerge quite naturally: to discover polynomial-time
algorithms (or even a PTAS) for the general case, or to identify subclasses of bimatrix games that admit a polynomial-time
(exact) algorithm, or at least a (F)PTAS. Even if one exchanges the ‘‘polynomiality’’ to ‘‘strict subexponentiality’’, there is
still much room for research. Indeed, the first subexponential-time approximation scheme was provided in [22] (see also
[3]), while a new one appeared only recently [30]. A sequence of papers have also provided polynomial-time algorithms
for various notions of approximation for 2NASH (e.g., [19,12,5,13,31,20]). The current winners are the gradient-based
algorithm of [31] that provides 0.3393-approximation for themost common notion of ε-Nash equilibria, while [20] provides
in polynomial time an (LP-based) 0.667-approximation for the more demanding notion of ε-well supported approximate
Nash Equilibria.
For polynomial-time exact algorithms (or even a FPTAS) for 2NASH in subclasses of bimatrix games, it is well known, by
vonNeumann’sminimax theorem [24], that any zero-sum (ZS) bimatrix game is polynomial-time solvable, via a single call to
an LP solver. Apart from ZS-games, there are other interesting properties that lead to non-trivial game subclasses for which
2NASH is polynomial-time tractable. For example, Moulin and Vial [25] studied, several years ago, bimatrix games having
exactly the same NE set with some ZS-game. This is why they called them strategically-zero-sum (SZS) games. The authors
also proposed a characterization of these games that allows both checking the SZS property and determining an equivalent
ZS-game, if the property holds, in polynomial time. Another easy-to-check property that assures polynomial-time
tractability of 2NASH, is the existence of pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) in the game. Finally, for the particular case of win–
lose bimatrix games, [9] provided a linear-time (exact) algorithm if the payoff matrices are very sparse, and [1] provided
a polynomial-time algorithm when the dynamics graph of the game is planar. Kannan & Theobald [18] introduced an
interesting hierarchy of bimatrix games according to the rank of thematrixR+C of the game ⟨R, C⟩, whichwas called the rank
of the game. For any fixed constant k ≥ 0, the authors presented a FPTAS for k-rank games, based on the work of Vavasis [32]
for approximating the optimum of an indefinite quadratic program. It is worth mentioning at this point that 0-rank games
are indeed the ZS-games. For the much richer class of 1-rank games, 2NASH has also been proved to be polynomial-time
tractable [2].
An alternative pathway to tractability is, rather than compute, to have the players cooperatively learn a NE point of a
game. For example, [27] initially proved that the fictitious play on behalf of both players converges to a NE point, for every
ZS-game (the same also holds for SZS-games). Rosen [28] introduced the notion of concave normal-form games, i.e., games in
which every player’s utility function (to bemaximized) is concave in her own strategy. For the special case of strictly concave
games, he proved global asymptotic stability and provided a gradient method for constructing a NE point. Of course, for the
bimatrix case Rosen’s concavity trivially holds, due to the bilinearity of the payoff functions. Even-Dar et al. [16] introduced
the notion of social concavity, according to which (i) there must exist a strict convex combination of all the players’ payoff
functions, that is a concave function in its domain, and (ii) each player’s payoff function is convex in the opponents’ profile of
strategies. It was then proved that for any finite normal-form game possessing this property, any no-external regret protocol
(when adopted by every player) assures that the empirical distributions of the players converge to a NE point. Our work was
inspired by [16] and we indeed explore exactly the meaning of this kind of ‘‘concavity’’ in the case of bimatrix games. But
rather than ‘‘learn’’, we explore the possibility of computing a NE point in polynomial time.
1.1. Our contribution and roadmap
The first part of the paper presents a novel parameterized quadratic formulation, (NEQP), which characterizes the NE
set of a bimatrix game (cf. Section 3). Of course, this is not the first (even quadratic) formulation that characterizes this
set. For example Mangasarian & Stone [23] already provided a quadratic program whose solution set is exactly the NE
set of the bimatrix game at hand. Nevertheless, our approach is (to our knowledge) the first to make a direct connection
between a subset of correlated equilibrium (CE) points and the NE points, in the CE polytope of the game at hand. The
profiles of (independent) strategies for the players that we consider, are provided as the marginal probability distributions
of correlated strategies which are already correlated equilibria. We prove (cf. Theorem 1) that the set of optimal solutions to
our parameterized quadratic formulation is in bijective correspondence with the NE set of the game, for any possible value
of the parameter in its range.
Many papers in the literature have explored the connection between the set of correlated equilibria (the CE polytope)
and the typically non-convex NE set of a bimatrix game (e.g., [15,26,33]). For example, Evangelista & Raghavan [15] have
shown that there exist bimatrix games inwhich the CE polytope is strict superset of the convex hull of (product distributions
of) the Nash equilibria. In particular, there exist bimatrix games possessing extreme correlated equilibria (vertices in the
CE polytope) whose marginals are not Nash equilibria. This implies that the rationale of just taking any linear / quadratic
objective function in the CE polytope does not necessarily lead to a point whose marginals are NE points. (NEQP) is, to our
knowledge, the only formulation that actually fulfills this property, by the proper choice of the same (quadratic) objective
function in the CE polytope, for all bimatrix games.
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The second part of the paper is algorithmic: we explore a property of bimatrix games which can assure polynomial-
time tractability of 2NASH, via the polynomial tractability of convex quadratic programs. In particular, we introduce the
property of mutual concavity (MC) for bimatrix games, which is enough to assure that the corresponding QP formulation
(either (NEQP), or a parameterized version of the QP formulation (MS) of [23]) is convex for some value of the involved
parameter. Due to convexity, these games immediately admit polynomial-time algorithms for finding a NE point. The MC
property (cf. Definition 1) demands the existence of some strict convex combination of the two payoff matrices, such that
the corresponding convex combination of the payoff functions of the two players be a concave function. This is enough to
guarantee convexity of both (NEQP) and the parameterized (MS) programs.
It is mentioned that the social concavity of [16] boils down to mutual concavity for bimatrix games, since the second
condition of the social concavity is trivial in the case of bimatrix games. But rather than trying to learn, we choose to compute
in polynomial-time a NE point of any MC-game (cf. Theorem 2).
Nevertheless, we are still far from being able to claim polynomial-time tractability of a certain new subclass of bimatrix
games (even if we are able either to compute, or learn a NE point for any particular member of the class), unless we are able
to solve the corresponding decision problem in polynomial time. For example, it is trivial to recognize in polynomial time
either a ZS-game, a fixed-rank game, or a game possessing PNE point. In order to explore this possibility also for MC-games,
we proceed (cf. Section 4) with a series of characterizations of the MC property (Propositions 4 and 8). Surprisingly, our last
characterization leads us to the equivalence of MC-games with the strategically zero sum (SZS) games of Moulin & Vial (cf.
Corollary 2). Therefore, our analytic demand for mutual concavity of the game is essentially equivalent to the behavioral
demand for strategic equivalence to a ZS-game. But our own characterization of this subclass of games via the MC property
(rather than the SZS property) allows much faster recognition of games belonging to the class. The drawback of using the
SZS property and then a single call to an LP solver, is that it is already computationally very expensive to determine an
equivalent ZS-game (in order to use an LP solver), compared to first checking the MC property and then making a single call
to a CQP solver (cf. Theorem 3). In particular, checking for the SZS-property and then using an LP solver would cost O

n6

,
whereas checking the MC-property and then using a CQP solver would cost O

n3.5

, where n is the maximum number of
actions (choices) per player.
The provided characterizations of mutual concavity also allow us to understand in more depth the expressiveness of
this subclass. For example, it is very simple to show that any constant-sum game belongs to this class (cf. Corollary 1),
but also demonstrate that there is a continuum of MC-games which are non-constant-sum. Additionally, the subclass of
MC-games is incomparable to the subclass of fixed-rank games [18].1 The MC-games demand the existence of some strict
convex combination of the payoff matrices which can be expressed as the sum of a matrix with equal columns plus a matrix
with equal rows (cf. Proposition 8), and therefore has rank at most 2. Nevertheless the small rank by itself is not sufficient
for mutual concavity: even rank-1 games (for which there clearly exists a strict convex combination of small rank) may
not beMC-games (e.g., Prisoner’s dilemma). On the other hand, we demonstrate the existence of MC-games with arbitrary
(even full) rank. As for MC-games of fixed rank, rather than providing an approximate NE point (e.g., via the approximation
technique of [32], as in [18]), we are able to construct an exact NE point in polynomial time.
We conclude by studying the closeness of the subclass of games possessing the MC-property, under Nash equilibrium
preserving game transformations, such as the positive affine transformations (cf. Section 5).
2. Preliminaries
Algebraic notation. For any positive number k ∈ N, [k] ≡ {1, 2, . . . , k}. In a k-dimensional space, for any positive
integer i, ei is the vector having all its elements zero, except for its i-th element which is equal to 1. 1 = i∈[k] ei is the
‘‘all-ones’’ vector, 0 is the ‘‘all-zeros’’ vector, and E = 1 · 1T is an ‘‘all-ones’’ square matrix. For any positive integer k,
∆k = {z ∈ Rk : 1T z = 1; z ≥ 0} is the set of all probability distributions over a k-element set, and Ok = {z ∈ Rk : 1T z = 0}.
For any vector x ∈ Rk and any i ∈ [k], (x)i = xi is the i-th element of x. For any matrix A ∈ Rm×n, (A)i,j = Ai,j is the value of
the corresponding cell in the matrix, Ai,⋆ is the i-th row of A (as a row vector) and A⋆,j is the j-th column of A (as a column
vector). AT denotes the transpose matrix of A. For any pair ofm× n real matrices A, B ∈ Rm×n, A • B ≡i∈[m]j∈[n] Ai,jBi,j.
Game theoretic notation. For any 2 ≤ m ≤ n, we denote by ⟨R, C⟩ an m × n bimatrix game, where the first player (aka
the row player) has R ∈ Rm×n as its payoff matrix and the second player (aka the column player) has C ∈ Rm×n as its payoff
matrix. If both the payoff matrices have exclusively rational entries, R, C ∈ Qm×n, then we refer to a rational bimatrix
game. These are mainly the games of concern in this work, for computational reasons. The row (column) player is assumed
to choose as her action one of the rows (columns) of the payoff bimatrix (R, C) = (Ri,j, Ci,j)(i,j)∈[m]×[n]. For any pair of actions
(i, j) ∈ [m] × [n], the payoff to the row (column) player is Ri,j (Ci,j).
A (mixed in general) strategy for the row (column) player is a probability distribution x ∈ ∆m (y ∈ ∆n), according
to which she determines her action, independently of the opponent’s final choice of action. If all the probability mass of a
mixed strategy for the row player is assigned to a particular action i ∈ [m], i.e., x = ei, then we refer to a pure strategy for
1 A game ⟨R, C⟩ is of fixed rank when rank(R+ C) is some constant.
S. Kontogiannis, P. Spirakis / Theoretical Computer Science 432 (2012) 64–76 67
this player. The utility (to be maximized) of the row (column) player for the profile of strategies (x, y) ∈ ∆m × ∆n is the
expected payoff xTRy (xTCy) that she gets.
For any real number ε ≥ 0, a profile of strategies (x¯, y¯) ∈ ∆m × ∆n is an ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-NE in short) of
⟨R, C⟩, iff each player’s strategy is an approximate best response (within an additive term of ε) to the opponent’s strategy:
∀x ∈ ∆m, x¯TRy¯ ≥ xTRy¯− ε and ∀y ∈ ∆n, x¯TC y¯ ≥ x¯TCy− ε. We denote by NE(R, C) the set of (exact) 0-NE points of ⟨R, C⟩.
A correlated strategy of ⟨R, C⟩ is a joint probability distributionW ∈ ∆m×n over thewhole set of action profiles [m]×[n]
for both players. A correlated strategy W ∈ ∆m×n is a correlated equilibrium (CE in short) of ⟨R, C⟩, iff it satisfies the
following system of linear inequalities:
∀i, k ∈ [m], j∈[n](Ri,j − Rk,j)Wi,j ≥ 0∀j, ℓ ∈ [n], i∈[m](Ci,j − Ci,ℓ)Wi,j ≥ 0
i∈[m]

j∈[n]Wi,j = 1∀(i, j) ∈ [m] × [n], Wi,j ≥ 0
[CE Property]
CE(R, C) is the (polyhedral) set of correlated equilibria of ⟨R, C⟩.
3. A quadratic formulation of NE points
In this sectionwe provide a parameterized quadratic programwhose feasible space is CE(R, C) for a bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩,
and its optimal solutions are in a bijective correspondencewith the NE points of the game, independently of the choice of the
parameter. For any correlated strategyW ∈ ∆m×n, we consider themarginal probabilities x(W ), y(W ) defined as follows:
∀i ∈ [m], xi(W ) =

ℓ∈[n]
Wi,ℓ ∀j ∈ [n], yj(W ) =

k∈[m]
Wk,j. (1)
We consider as the row player’s loss gR(W )wrt a correlated strategyW , her decrease in payoff when both players adopt the
marginal distributions ofW , rather than abiding with the correlated strategy (the column player’s loss gC (W ) is analogous,
we only substitute matrix Rwith matrix C):
gR(W ) ≡

i∈[m]

j∈[n]
Ri,jWi,j − x(W )TR y(W )
=

i∈[m]

j∈[n]
Ri,j

Wi,j −

k∈[m]

ℓ∈[n]
Wi,ℓWk,j

.
We consider the following parameterized quadratic program, NEQP(λ), for any constant λ ∈ (0, 1), bounded away from
both its boundaries:
minimize {λ · gR(W )+ (1− λ) · gC (W ) : W ∈ CE(R, C)} [NEQP(λ)]
We denote with opt(NEQP(λ)) the set of optimal solutions for NEQP(λ). We shall prove that there is a bijective map
between opt(NEQP(λ)) and NE(R, C). The proof proceeds in steps which we present as a sequence of propositions. We
start by showing that both players’ losses for (mutually) adopting their marginal distributions, rather than abiding with the
correlated strategy, are non-negative:
Proposition 1. ∀R, C ∈ Rm×n,∀W ∈ CE(R, C), gR(W ) ≥ 0 ∧ gC (W ) ≥ 0 .
Proof. We provide the proof only for the row player, the other argument is identical. Let k ∈ argmaxi∈[m]

Ri,⋆ y(W )

be
any pure best response of the row player to the strategy y(W ) of the opponent. Obviously xTR y ≤ max(Ry), for any profile
(x, y). Thus:
x(W )TR y(W ) ≤ Rk,⋆ y(W ) =

j∈[n]
Rk,jyj(W )
=

j∈[n]
Rk,j

i∈[m]
Wi,j =

i∈[m]

j∈[n]
Rk,jWi,j
≤

i∈[m]

j∈[n]
Ri,jWi,j
from which it is obvious that gR(W ) ≥ 0. The last inequality is by the CE Property ofW . 
We continue by showing that any NE point of ⟨R, C⟩ induces an optimal solution of NEQP(λ):
Proposition 2. ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), ∀(x¯, y¯) ∈ NE(R, C), W¯ ≡ x¯ · y¯T ∈ opt(NEQP(λ)) .
Proof. It is well known (and trivial to check) that the joint distribution of any NE point is a CE point of the game. So,
W¯ ≡ x¯ · y¯T ∈ CE(R, C). It remains to assure that the objective value of W¯ in NEQP(λ) is zero. Of course, it suffices to
68 S. Kontogiannis, P. Spirakis / Theoretical Computer Science 432 (2012) 64–76
prove that gR(W¯ ) = gC (W¯ ) = 0. We prove this only for the row player, the other argument being symmetrical. Observe
that:
gR(W¯ ) =

i∈[m]

j∈[n]
Ri,j

W¯i,j −

k∈[m]

ℓ∈[n]
W¯i,ℓW¯k,j

=

i∈[m]

j∈[n]

k∈[m]

ℓ∈[n]
Ri,j

W¯i,jW¯k,ℓ − W¯i,ℓW¯k,j

=

i∈[m]

j∈[n]

k∈[m]

ℓ∈[n]
Ri,j

x¯iy¯jx¯ky¯ℓ − x¯iy¯ℓx¯ky¯j
 = 0
where the second equality is due to the observation that

k

ℓ W¯k,ℓ = 1, and the last equality follows from the following
fact, which is simple to check: for any correlated strategyW = x · yT that equals the joint distribution of two independent
strategies for the players, the marginal profile (x(W ), y(W )) is identical to the original profile (x, y). 
Our final step is to verify that every optimal solution W¯ ∈ opt(NEQP(λ)) induces a profile of marginal strategies which is a
NE point of the game.
Proposition 3. ∀λ ∈ (0, 1), ∀W¯ ∈ opt(NEQP(λ)), (x(W¯ ), y(W¯ )) ∈ NE(R, C) .
Proof. The proof is straightforward, if one observes (cf. proof of Proposition 1) that 0 ≤ maxi∈[m]{Ri,⋆y(W¯ )} − x(W¯ )T
R y(W¯ ) ≤ gR(W¯ ) = 0 . The same also holds for the column player. So, no player may profit if she unilaterally deviates
from her marginal distribution induced by W¯ , given that the opponent abides with her own marginal distribution. 
From the above discussion it is now obvious that for any λ ∈ (0, 1), NEQP(λ) provides a characterization of the NE property
in bimatrix games, as claimed in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For any real number λ ∈ (0, 1), any pair of payoff matrices, R, C ∈ Rm×n, and any profile of strategies (x¯, y¯) ∈
∆m×∆n, the following holds: If (x¯, y¯) ∈ NE(R, C) then W¯ ≡ x¯ · y¯T ∈ opt(NEQP(λ)), and conversely, for all W¯ ∈ opt(NEQP(λ))
(x(W¯ ), y(W¯ )) ∈ NE(R, C).
It is now quite natural to investigate for which cases the characterization of Theorem 1 might help us in constructing an
arbitrary NE point of the game. For computational reasons we have to focus our attention to rational bimatrix games only.
Observe that for any λ ∈ (0, 1), the program NEQP(λ) corresponding to such a game, has at least one rational solution:
any rational bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩ has at least one solution (x¯, y¯) ∈ NE(R, C) in which both players’ strategies are rational
vectors.2 The joint distribution W¯ ≡ x¯ · y¯T is also a rational optimum to NEQP(λ). Observe finally that strict containment of
λ in (0, 1) is crucial, in order for Proposition 3 to hold. We consider the following property of bimatrix games, which assures
tractability of NEQP(λ) for some value λ ∈ (0, 1), when all the payoff values are rational numbers:
Definition 1. For arbitrary R, C ∈ Qm×n and any λ ∈ (0, 1), Z(λ) = λR + (1 − λ)C , and Hλ(x, y) ≡ xTZ(λ)y. ⟨R, C⟩ is
mutually concave (MC) game iff the following holds:
[MC1] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. Hλ(x, y) is a concave function of (x, y) ∈ ∆m × ∆n : ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), ∀(x¯, y¯), (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ ∆m ×
∆n, Hλ(µ(x¯, y¯)+ (1− µ)(xˆ, yˆ)) ≥ µHλ(x¯, y¯)+ (1− µ)Hλ(xˆ, yˆ).
Returning to our quadratic formulation for the NE set of a bimatrix game, observe that the objective function of NEQP(λ)
is:
Gλ(W ) ≡ λ · gR(W )+ (1− λ) · gC (W )
=

i∈[m]

j∈[n]

λRi,j + (1− λ)Ci,j

Wi,j − x(W )T [λR+ (1− λ)C]y(W )
= Z(λ) •W − Hλ(x(W ), y(W )).
Theorem 2. For any pair of natural numbers 2 ≤ m ≤ n, and any R, C ∈ Qm×n, assume that ⟨R, C⟩ is mutually concave. Then
either there is a pure NE, or else mutual concavity holds, for a unique rational number λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) (of the same bit complexity as
the input). In the latter case, an exact NE point can be constructed in time O(T (m, n)), where T (m, n) is the time for solving the
corresponding (convex) QP formulation, whose optimal set is in a bijective correspondence with the NE set of ⟨R, C⟩.
2 If we fix the (nonempty) supports I ⊆ [m], J ⊆ [n] of any (unknown) Nash equilibrium of the game, then we can write a system of linear equations
and inequalities (with rational coefficients for all variables, and rational constants) which is well known to have at least one rational solution. But, any
solution to that linear system is a Nash equilibrium of the game with the given supports for the strategies of the two players.
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Remark. The time complexity for solving an N-variable convex program
min {f0(x) : ∀i ∈ [M], fi(x) ≤ 0; Ax = b}
where A ∈ Qk×N , b ∈ Qk, and the functions fi are all convex, is roughly proportional to
√
M · max{N3,N2 · M, F}, where
F is the worst-case cost for evaluating any of the fi’s, their first and second derivatives (e.g., see [4,6]). For the particular
case of NEQP(λ), for some rational number λ ∈ (0, 1), N = mn and there are M = Om2n2 (linear) constraints, while
F = Om2n2. This would therefore imply that the worst case cost for NEQP(λ) is T (m, n) = On4m4 = On8 assuming
m ≤ n, which is quite large. This is because of the large number of variables and inequality constraints in NEQP(λ).
Nevertheless, this heavy time-complexity can be very easily dropped down toO

n3.5

, if we replace NEQP(λ)with a similar
parameterized version of Mangasarian and Stone’s quadratic formulation:
min. λ

r − xTRy+ (1− λ) c − xTCy
s.t. r1− Ry ≥ 0
c1− CTx ≥ 0
1Tx = 1
1Ty = 1
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0
[MS(λ)]
This formulation involves onlym+n+2 variables and 2m+2n+2 linear constraints, and the existence of a proper λ ∈ (0, 1)
to assure its convexity again depends on the mutual concavity of the game. It also trivially holds that any global optimum of
this program determines a NE point of the game. The worst-case time complexity of this program is nowO

n3.5

, assuming
2 ≤ m ≤ n.
Proof of Theorem 2. The fact that if a rational bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩ is mutually concave then it either has a pure Nash
equilibrium, or else mutual concavity holds for some unique rational number λ∗ ∈ (0, 1), will be proved later via the
characterization ofmutual concavity thatwe shall provide (cf. Theorem3). For the latter case of a unique, rationalλ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
that proves mutual concavity, both NEQP(λ∗) and MS(λ∗) are convex quadratic programs. The linear constraints trivially
have rational coefficients. As for the objective function (e.g., Gλ∗ for NEQP(λ∗), analogous argument holds for the objective of
the MS-formulation), all its coefficients are also rationals, and it is the sum of two convex functions: the first term is a linear
function of W , and the second term −Hλ∗(x(W ), y(W )) is convex in W : ∀W¯ , Wˆ ∈ CE(R, C),∀µ ∈ (0, 1),W = µW¯ +
(1−µ)Wˆ , it holds that x(W ) = x(µW¯+(1−µ)Wˆ ) = µx(W¯ )+(1−µ)x(Wˆ ) and similarly, y(W ) = µy(W¯ )+(1−µ)y(Wˆ ).
Then we have that
−Hλ∗(x(W ), y(W )) = −Hλ∗

µx(W¯ )+ (1− µ)x(Wˆ ), µy(W¯ )+ (1− µ)y(Wˆ )

≤ −µHλ∗

x(W¯ ), y(W¯ )
− (1− µ)Hλ∗ x(Wˆ ), y(Wˆ )
where the inequality is due to the convexity of−Hλ∗ . And, of course, a single call to a CQP solver suffices to solve the game. It
is finally easy to observe that the dominating term in the time-complexity is the execution time T (m, n) of the CQP solver. 
In the next section we demonstrate the essential equivalence of the MC-property and the SZS-property for bimatrix
games, which implies that 2NASH for MC-games could also be solved via a single call of a linear programming (LP) solver.
Nevertheless, as we shall explain then, determining the proper LP to solve can be already (computationally) too much to
afford, compared to the method we propose which demands a computation of λ∗ in time O

m2n

and then the solution of
the proper CQPMS(λ∗) in time O

n3.5

.
4. Equivalence of MC-property and SZS-property
Although we already know that for any MC-game it is possible to construct in polynomial time a NE point (at least) via
convex optimization techniques, we still need to be able to recognize such games in polynomial time. For example, it is
trivial to check whether a bimatrix game has the zero-sum property, possesses a pure NE point, is a coordination game (i.e.,
equal payoffs to both players, for any action profile), or is a fixed-rank game, and then solve it (in case of an affirmative
answer). In this section we provide a series of characterizations of the MC-property that: (i) demonstrate the generality of
the subclass, and (ii) show how to check it in polynomial time. These characterizations are indeed quite enlightening, since
they reveal the essential equivalence of the analytic MC-property, with the behavioral SZS-property (cf. [25]).
Proposition 4. For any rational bimatrix game ⟨A, B⟩ and λ ∈ (0, 1), let Z(λ) = λA+ (1− λ)B, Hλ(x, y) ≡ xTZ(λ)y. ⟨A, B⟩ is
mutually concave iff any the following conditions holds:
[MC1] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. Hλ(x, y) is a concave function of (x, y) ∈ ∆m × ∆n : ∀µ ∈ (0, 1), ∀(x¯, y¯), (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ ∆m × ∆n,
Hλ(µ(x¯, y¯)+ (1− µ)(xˆ, yˆ)) ≥ µHλ(x¯, y¯)+ (1− µ)Hλ(xˆ, yˆ) .
[MC3] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀(ξ , ψ) ∈ Om × On, ξ TZ(λ)ψ = 0.
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[MC4] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀ψ ∈ On, Z(λ)ψ = 1 · (Z(λ)ψ)1.
[MC5] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀ξ ∈ Om, Z(λ)T ξ = 1 · (Z(λ)T ξ)1.
Proof. We start by proving the equivalence of [MC1] and [MC3]. By the requirement for concavity of Hλ(x, y) in its domain
∆m ×∆n, for the particular value λ ∈ (0, 1), we have:
[MC1]⇔
∃λ ∈ (0, 1),∀µ ∈ (0, 1),∀(x˜, y˜), (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ ∆m ×∆n,
Hλ(µ(x˜, y˜)+ (1− µ)(xˆ, yˆ)) ≥ µHλ(x˜, y˜)+ (1− µ)Hλ(xˆ, yˆ)
⇔ (µx˜+ (1− µ)xˆ)TZ(λ)(µy˜+ (1− µ)yˆ) ≥ µx˜TZ(λ)y˜+ (1− µ)xˆTZ(λ)yˆ
⇔ (µ− µ2)[x˜TZ(λ)y˜+ xˆZ(λ)yˆ] ≤ (µ− µ2)[x˜TZ(λ)yˆ+ xˆZ(λ)y˜]
⇔ (x˜− xˆ)TZ(λ)(y˜− yˆ) ≤ 0
where the last equivalence is due to the fact thatµ ∈ (0, 1). Observe now that if we consider an arbitrary vector ξ ∈ Om\{0},
then clearly for x˜ = 1m1, it holds that xˆ = x˜+ δ(ξ) · ξ ∈ ∆m, after scaling ξ by a factor δ(ξ) =

m ·maxi∈[m] |ξi|
−1
> 0, so
that xˆ ∈ ∆m. Similarly, for any vector ψ ∈ On and y˜ = 1n1, it again holds that yˆ = y˜+ δ(ψ) · ψ ∈ ∆n (again with a proper
scaling δ(ψ) > 0). Therefore, we conclude that [MC1] is equivalent to the following:
[MC2] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1),∀(ξ , ψ) ∈ Om × On, ξ TZ(λ)ψ ≤ 0.
But, for arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1), if we find (ξ , ψ) ∈ Om × On : ξ TZ(λ)ψ < 0, then clearly it holds also that (−ξ, ψ) ∈ Om × On
and (−ξ)TZ(λ)ψ > 0. Therefore, this choice of λ cannot assure the validity of [MC2] (or [MC1]). We thus conclude to the
equivalent expression of [MC1]:
[MC3] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1),∀(ξ , ψ) ∈ Om × On, ξ TZ(λ)ψ = 0.
Assume now that for arbitrary λ ∈ (0, 1), ∃ψ ∈ On, ∃i, k ∈ [m] : (Z(λ)ψ)i > (Z(λ)ψ)k. Then clearly for ξ = ei − ek ∈ Om
it holds that ξ TZ(λ)ψ = (Z(λ)ψ)i − (Z(λ)ψ)k > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for [MC3] is the following:
[MC4] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1),∀ψ ∈ On, Z(λ) · ψ = (Z(λ)ψ)1 · 1.
It remains to prove that [MC4] is also sufficient for [MC3]. But this is straightforward, since ∀ξ ∈ Om,∀c ∈ R, ξ T (c · 1) =
c · (ξ T1) = 0. Therefore, [MC4] is equivalent to [MC3]. The proof is identical for the case of [MC5]. 
It is now easy to observe that any constant-sum bimatrix game is mutually concave:
Corollary 1. For any A ∈ Rm×n and c ∈ R, the c-sum m × n bimatrix game ⟨A,−A + c · E⟩, where E = 1 · 1T , is a mutually
concave game.
Proof. If we set λ = 12 then Z(λ) = c2 · E and now, for any (ξ , ψ) ∈ Om × On it holds that ξ TZ(λ)ψ = c2 · ξ T · E · ψ =
c
2 · ξ T · 1  
=0
· 1T · ψ  
=0
= 0. 
At this point we explore the mutual concavity of 2 × 2 bimatrix games. The following proposition provides a simple
characterization of mutual concavity for this simple case:
Proposition 5. For any A, B ∈ R2×2, let a¯ = A1,1 + A2,2 − A1,2 − A2,1 and b¯ = B1,1 + B2,2 − B1,2 − B2,1. The bimatrix game
⟨A, B⟩ is mutually concave iff the following condition holds:
[B1] a¯ = b¯ = 0 ∨min{a¯, b¯} < 0 < max{a¯, b¯}
Proof. By [MC4] we know that a necessary and sufficient condition for the mutual concavity of ⟨A, B⟩ is that there exists
λ ∈ (0, 1) for which the following holds: ∀[ψ,−ψ]T ∈ R2 − {0},
Z(λ) ·

ψ
−ψ

1
=

Z(λ) ·

ψ
−ψ

2
⇔ λψA1,1 + (1− λ)ψB1,1 − λψA1,2 − (1− λ)ψB1,2
= λψA2,1 + (1− λ)ψB2,1 − λψA1,1 − (1− λ)ψB1,1
⇔ ψ[λa¯+ (1− λ)b¯] = 0⇔ λa¯+ (1− λ)b¯ = b¯+ λ(a¯− b¯) = 0
since ψ ≠ 0. We study three mutually exclusive cases:
b¯ = 0: Then λa¯ = 0 /∗ λ≠0 ∗/⇔ a¯ = 0. So, in this case we have: a¯ = b¯ = 0 .
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b¯ > 0: Then:
λ[a¯− b¯] = −b¯ < 0⇔

λ > 0 : a¯− b¯ < 0⇔ a¯ < b¯
and
λ < 1 : λ = −b¯
a¯−b¯ = b¯b¯−a¯ < 1⇔ a¯ < 0.
Therefore, in this case we have: b¯ > 0 > a¯ .
b¯ < 0: Then:
λ[a¯− b¯] = −b¯ > 0⇔

λ > 0 : a¯− b¯ > 0⇔ a¯ > b¯
and
λ < 1 : λ = −b¯
a¯−b¯ < 1⇔ a¯ > 0.
Therefore, in this case we have: a¯ > 0 > b¯ . 
For example, in Fig. 1.(a,b,c) we present 2 × 2 games both with and without the mutual concavity. Observe that example
1.(c) actually presents a continuum of 2× 2, non-constant-sum MC-games, rather than just a single game.
Consider now, for integers 2 ≤ m ≤ n, an arbitrary pair of payoff matrices A, B ∈ Rm×n. Let ∀ 1 ≤ i < k ≤ m,∀ 1 ≤
j < ℓ ≤ n, a¯ik,jℓ = Ai,j + Ak,ℓ − Ai,ℓ − Ak,j and b¯ik,jℓ = Bi,j + Bk,ℓ − Bi,ℓ − Bk,j. As a consequence of Proposition 5, we get the
following necessary condition for the mutual concavity of ⟨A, B⟩:
Proposition 6. If ⟨A, B⟩ is mutually concave, then the following condition holds:
[B2] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1) : ∀1 ≤ i < k ≤ m, ∀1 ≤ j < ℓ ≤ n,
[a¯ik,jℓ = b¯ik,jℓ = 0]
∨
max{a¯ik,jℓ, b¯ik,jℓ} > 0 > min{a¯ik,jℓ, b¯ik,jℓ} ∧ λ = −b¯ik,jℓa¯ik,jℓ−b¯ik,jℓ

.
Remark. [B2] is also a sufficient condition, for any 2 × n bimatrix game, since if for any

ξ
−ξ

∈ O2 it holds that
∀j ∈ [n], [ξ,−ξ ] · (Z(λ))⋆,1 = [ξ,−ξ ] · (Z(λ))⋆,j, then clearly ∀ψ ∈ On, [ξ,−ξ ] · Z(λ) · ψ = 0. The unique parameter of
mutual concavity is λ∗ = −b¯12,12
a¯12,12−b¯12,12 . The example in Fig. 1.(d) provides a continuum of non-constant 3× 2 MC-games.
Next we prove that computing a NE point in a bimatrix gamewith all the a¯ and b¯ values equal to zero, is polynomial-time
tractable (independently of the validity of the mutual concavity) due to the existence of pure NE points:
Proposition 7. For any pair of m×nmatrices A, B ∈ Qm×n, for which ∀{i, k} ⊆ [m],∀j, ℓ ⊆ [n], a¯ik,jℓ = b¯ik,jℓ = 0, the rational
bimatrix game ⟨A, B⟩ admits a pure NE point.
Proof. Observe that the two payoff matrices are completely determined by their first row and first column (i.e., bym+n−1
cells of each matrix). For example, Amust have the following shape, in order for all the a¯ values to be equal to zero:
A =

A1,1 A1,2 · · · A1,n
A2,1 A1,2 + A2,1 − A1,1 · · · A1,n + A2,1 − A1,1
A3,1 A1,2 + A3,1 − A1,1 · · · A1,n + A3,1 − A1,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Am,1 A1,2 + Am,1 − A1,1 · · · A1,n + Am,1 − A1,1

=

A1,1 A1,1 + [A1,2 − A1,1] · · · A1,1 + [A1,n − A1,1]
A2,1 A2,1 + [A1,2 − A1,1] · · · A2,1 + [A1,n − A1,1]
A3,1 A3,1 + [A1,2 − A1,1] · · · A3,1 + [A1,n − A1,1]
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Am,1 Am,1 + [A1,2 − A1,1] · · · Am,1 + [A1,n − A1,1]

= A⋆,1, A⋆,1, . . . , A⋆,1+

aT
aT
.
.
.
aT

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silent betray
silent (−1,−1) (−10, 0)
betray (0,−10) (−5,−5)
cinema football
cinema (2, 1) (0, 0)
football (0, 0) (1, 2)
(a) Prisoners’ Dilemma. (b) Battle of Sexes.
L R
T (2, 1) (1, 1+ γ )
B (1, 1) (3, 0)
L R
T (2, 1) (1, 1+ γ )
M (1, 1) (3, 0)
B (δ1, δ2) (ε1, ε2)
(c) 2× 2 MC game. (d) 3× 2 MC game.
Fig. 1. (a) The non-mutually concave rank-1 ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ game. (b) The non-mutually concave rank-2 game ‘‘Battle of Sexes’’. (c) A generic (non-
constant-sum) 2 × 2 game that is mutually concave, ∀γ > −1. (d) A generic (non-constant-sum) 3 × 2 game that is a mutually concave ∀γ > −1,
δ1, δ2, ε1 ∈ R, ε2 = δ2 + 13 · [2γ − 1− (1+ γ ) · (ε1 − δ1)]. Observe that the unique value λ = 1+γ4+γ makes xT Z(λ)y in this game a concave function.
where aT = 0, A1,2 − A1,1, A1,3 − A1,1, . . . , A1,n − A1,1. Similarly, we conclude that Bmust have the following shape:
B =

B1,1 B1,2 · · · B1,n
B2,1 B1,2 + B2,1 − B1,1 · · · B1,n + B2,1 − B1,1
B3,1 B1,2 + B3,1 − B1,1 · · · B1,n + B3,1 − B1,1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bm,1 B1,2 + Bm,1 − B1,1 · · · B1,n + Bm,1 − B1,1

=

B1,⋆
B1,⋆
.
.
.
B1,⋆
+ [b, b, . . . , b]
where b = 0, B2,1 − B1,1, B3,1 − B1,1, . . . , Bm,1 − B1,1T .
If we now consider the (rank-1) matrices R = A⋆,1, . . . , A⋆,1 and C = (B1,⋆)T , . . . , (B1,⋆)T T then clearly the games
⟨A, B⟩ and ⟨R, C⟩ have the sameNash equilibrium sets, since∀y ∈ ∆n, Ay = Ry+(aTy)1, and∀x ∈ ∆m, xTB = xTC+(xTb)1T .
But it is trivial to check that there is a (pure) Nash equilibrium in ⟨R, C⟩. 
We now provide a final necessary and sufficient condition for mutual concavity of ⟨A, B⟩ that applies directly to the
combined matrix Z(λ) = λA + (1 − λ)B. This property is extremely interesting, since it leads us to the conclusion that
the MC-property is essentially equivalent to the strategic equivalence of the game with some zero sum game (i.e., the
SZS-property ofMoulin andVial [25]). It also indicates that Z(λ)must have rank atmost 2, but of course this is not a sufficient
condition for mutual concavity, as was shown in previous examples (cf. Fig. 1). On the other hand, as we shall see shortly, a
mutually concave game may have arbitrary (even full) rank.
Proposition 8. For any m, n ≥ 2 and real matrices A, B ∈ Rm×n, the bimatrix game ⟨A, B⟩ is mutually concave if and only if any
of the following properties holds:
[MC6] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1), ∃a ∈ Rm, ∃δ = [0, δ2, . . . , δn]T ∈ Rn : ∀j ∈ [n], Z(λ)⋆,j = −δj · 1+ a
[MC7] ∃λ ∈ (0, 1), ∃b ∈ Rn, ∃ε = [0, ε2, . . . , εm]T ∈ Rm : ∀i ∈ [m], Z(λ)i,⋆ = −εi · 1T + bT
Proof. We exploit the necessary and sufficient properties [MC4] and [MC5] for the mutual concavity of ⟨A, B⟩:
1. By [MC4], it must hold, for some arbitrary real vector δ = [0, δ2, . . . , δn] ∈ Rn, that ∀j ∈ [n],∀i ∈ [m], Z(λ)i,1−Z(λ)i,j =
δj, if we consider the proper zero-sum vectors ψ(j) = e1 − ej ∈ On. But this then implies that ∀j ∈ [n], Z(λ)⋆,j =
Z(λ)⋆,1− δj1. Therefore, Z(λ)⋆,1 = a ∈ Rm is a free column, and all the other rows of Z(λ)must be expressed as follows:
∀j ≥ 2, Z(λ)⋆,j = a− δj1. That is:
Z(λ) = [a, a− δ2 · 1, . . . , a− δn · 1] .
2. Similarly, by [MC5], we prove that for some arbitrary real vectors b ∈ Rn and ε = [0, ε2, . . . , εm]T ∈ Rm Z(λ)must have
the following shape:
Z(λ) =

bT
−ε2 · 1T + bT
...
−εm · 1T + bT
 . 
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It is now very easy to construct n× n games of full rank, which are nevertheless mutually concave. E.g., for n = 7, consider
the vectors b = [1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64]T , ε = [0,−1, 1,−2, 2,−3, 3]T . The corresponding matrix Z that complies with
[MC7] is the following:
Z =

1 2 4 8 16 32 64
0 1 3 7 15 31 63
2 3 5 9 17 33 65
−1 0 2 6 14 30 62
3 4 6 10 18 34 66
−2 −1 1 5 13 29 61
4 5 7 11 19 35 67

with rank(Z) = 2. Nevertheless, for A = I7 being the identity matrix and λ = 1/4, the unique choice of B so that
Z(λ) = λA + (1 − λ)B = Z is B = 43Z − 13A. It is straightforward to check that rank(A) = rank(B) = rank(A + B) = 7,
and thus the game has full rank. In a similar fashion we could construct full-rank MC-games, for any number of actions per
player.
The characterization of Proposition 8 indeed proves that we are in seek for a proper convex combination of the payoff
matrices, which is given as the sum of two matrices, one with identical columns and one with identical rows. So we have
the following straightforward corollary:
Corollary 2. For any m, n ≥ 2 and A, B ∈ Rm×n, the bimatrix game ⟨A, B⟩ is mutually concave iff for the vector of 1 + m + n
variables (λ∗, a, b) ∈ (0, 1)× Rm × Rn the following system of m · n linear equalities is satisfiable:
λ∗A+ (1− λ∗)B = [a, a, . . . , a]+
 b
T
...
bT
 .
In particular, this can be checked in time O

m2n

.
This characterization of MC-games is identical to a characterization of (non-trivial) SZS-games proposed by Moulin and Vial
[25, Theorem 2.ii]. So, we are lead to the conclusion that the MC property and the SZS-property indicate the same subclass
of (non-trivial) bimatrix games3. This characterization of SZS-games is not particularly helpful for solving 2NASH via LP,
because it does not specify an equivalent ZS-game to be solved. But [25] provide the following equivalent characterization
of nontrivial SZS-games, which allows the computation of the required ZS-game:
Proposition 9 (Moulin & Vial, [25, Theorem 2.iii]). For any m, n ≥ 2 and A, B ∈ Rm×n, the bimatrix game ⟨A, B⟩ is (non-trivial)
strategically-zero-sum iff for the 2 + m + n + mn variables (ρ, σ , a, b,D) ∈ R++ × R++ × Rm × Rn × Rm×n the following
system of 2mn linear equalities is satisfiable:
ρA = D+
 b
T
...
bT

σB = −D+ [a, a, . . . , a] .
Remark. According to the characterization of Proposition 9, the strategically equivalent zero-sum game ⟨D,−D⟩ of a SZS-
game ⟨A, B⟩ can be determined in time Om3n3, by solving the proper system of linear equations. The computation of
⟨D,−D⟩ would then allow us now to use a linear (rather than convex) optimization tools to construct a NE point of ⟨A, B⟩.
Nevertheless, this is already too expensive as a whole, compared to the overall computational cost of O

n3.5

required by
the direct solution of the proper quadratic programMS(λ∗), which does not demand the explicit knowledge of ⟨D,−D⟩.
The above discussion allows us now to prove the efficiency of checking mutual concavity in non-trivial bimatrix games
(e.g., those having no pure Nash equilibria):
Theorem 3. For any natural numbers n ≥ m ≥ 2, and rational matrices A, B ∈ Qm×n the following hold:
1. If all the a¯- and b¯-values of its 2× 2 submatrices are zero then there is a pure NE point.
2. There is at most one candidate parameter λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for which mutual concavity must be checked, which can be computed
in time O

m2 · n. In the positive case, the MC-game can be solved in On3.5 elementary operations.
Proof. The first claim has already been proved in Proposition 7, since it is simple to find a pure NE point, if it exists. For
the second claim, recall that Corollary 2 allows the computation of a proper λ∗ (if such exists) in timeO

n3

. We then use a
convex optimization tool that will solveMS(λ∗) in time O

n3.5

. 
3 A bimatrix game is considered as trivial in [25], if for at least one (row/column) player any row (column) of her payoff matrix is written as a convex
combination of two specific rows (columns). For example, a 2× 2 game is trivial if there exists a dominating strategy for one of the players.
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5. Closeness of mutual concavity
In game theory literature it is quite common to consider various Nash equilibrium preserving transformations of a game,
and then try to work on the new game. One of the most typical transformations of this kind is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Consider the matrices R, C ∈ Rm×n and the corresponding bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩. For any scalars γI , γII ∈ R++
and vectors r ∈ Rn, c ∈ Rm, the game ⟨A, B⟩where:
A = γI · R+
 r
T
...
rT
 , B = γII · C + [c, c, . . . , c] ,
is called a positive affine transformation (PAT) of ⟨R, C⟩. In case that γI = γII ∈ R++, then we refer to a uniform positive
affine transformation (UPAT) of the game ⟨R, C⟩. If additionally γI = γII = 1, then we refer to an additive transformation
(AdT).
A well-known (and trivial to prove) fact is that any PAT of a bimatrix game preserves the Nash equilibrium set:
Fact 1. For any scalars γI , γII ∈ R++ and any real vectors r ∈ Rn, c ∈ Rm, any bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩ and its corresponding PAT
⟨A, B⟩ with parameters (γI , r) for the row player and (γII , c) for the column player, have exactly the same Nash equilibria.
We shall prove that themutual concavity of bimatrix games is closed under UPAT, but unfortunately is not necessarily closed
under non-uniform PAT.
Theorem 4. For any scalar γ ∈ R++, any real vectors r ∈ Rn, c ∈ Rm and any bimatrix game ⟨R, C⟩, let ⟨A, B⟩ be its UPAT with
common scaling factor γ and additive vectors r, c. Then, ⟨R, C⟩ is mutually concave if and only if ⟨A, B⟩ is mutually concave.
Proof. Since PAT is a bidirectional transformation, it suffices to prove that if ⟨R, C⟩ satisfies MC then ⟨A, B⟩ also satisfies MC.
Recall that ⟨R, C⟩ is mutually concave iff property [MC6] holds. So let us assume that ∃a ∈ Rm, ∃δ = [0, δ2, . . . , δn]T ∈ Rn
such that
λR+ (1− λ)C = [a, . . . , a] + [0, δ21, . . . , δnn].
We shall prove that an analogous property also holds for ⟨A, B⟩:
λA+ (1− λ)B
= λ
γ R+
 r
T
...
rT

+ (1− λ) (γ C + [c, . . . , c])
= γ [λR+ (1− λ)C] +
 λr
T
...
λrT
+ [(1− λ)c, . . . , (1− λ)c]
= [γ a, . . . , γ a] + [0, γ δ21, . . . , γ δn1] +
 λr
T
...
λrT
+ [(1− λ)c, . . . , (1− λ)c]
= [γ a+ (1− λ)c, . . . , γ a+ (1− λ)c] +
 γ δ
T + λrT
...
γ δT + λrT

=
(γ δ1 + λr1)1+ γ a+ (1− λ)c  
=a˜
, . . . , (γ δ1 + λr1)1+ γ a+ (1− λ)c

+
0, (γ δ2 + λr2 − γ δ1 − λr1)  
=δ˜2
1, . . . , (γ δn + λrn − γ δ1 − λr1)  
=δ˜n
1

= a˜, . . . , a˜+ 0, δ˜21, . . . , δ˜n1 . 
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silent betray
silent (6, 6) (0, 10)
betray (10, 0) (4, 4)
Fig. 2. An alternative form of the PD game, which happens to have the MC property.
Unfortunately, the MC-property of bimatrix games is not necessarily preserved under general (in particular, non-uniform)
PAT. Additionally, one might also argue that there exist (non-affine) transformations of particular bimatrix games, which
are Nash equilibrium preserving, for which the MC-property is not preserved. For example, one might use the form for the
prisoner’s dilemmagame given in Fig. 2. It is trivial to see that this formof PDpossesses theMC-property, but there is actually
no affine transformation (let alone PAT) that can lead from the non-mutually concave PD version in Fig. 1, to this mutually
concave PD version. In our opinion, it is crucial to focus our interest on generic Nash equilibrium preserving transformations
of games, such as PAT. It is neverthelessmentioned that also other crucial properties, such as the ratio of approximate (rather
than exact) Nash equilibria is not preserved, indeed not even under AdT alone. This of course does not lessen the importance
of such properties, but rather indicates an additional difficulty that we face when exploring them.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented a novel characterization of the Nash equilibrium set of a bimatrix game, via the solution
set of an appropriate (parameterized) quadratic program, whose feasible space contains all the correlated equilibria of the
game. Consequently, we explored the effect of mutual concavity in bimatrix games in order, exploiting such a quadratic
formulation, to assure polynomial time construction for a NE point.
We then provided a series of characterizations for mutual concavity, ending up with a characterization that proves
the equivalence of MC-games with (non-trivial) SZS-games of Moulin and Vial [25]. Nevertheless, we explained that it is
computationally more efficient to solve these games by a direct single call to a CQP solver, rather than first computing the
equivalent zero-sum game and then solving it by a single call to an LP solver.
We also observed that the class of MC-games, which entirely contains all constant-sum games, is incomparable to the
class of bimatrix games with fixed rank: even rank-1 games may be non-MC-games, and even full-rank games may be MC-
games. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for the intersection of MC-games of fixed rank, rather than giving a FPTAS,
we find in polynomial time an exact NE point via the optimal solution to our convex quadratic, or even a linear program
(corresponding to the strategically equivalent zero-sum game).
For further research, the main challenges are to either extend the class of polynomial-time computable bimatrix games,
or improve the approximation ratio (or even find a PTAS) for the general case of rational bimatrix games.
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